19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 746a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1909MAUG
Insurance -- Personal injury protection -- Coverage -- Emergency services -- Exhaustion of policy limits -- Where insurer is mandated by statute to reserve $5,000 for emergency medical service providers, and medical provider within that classification filed claim within 30 days of insurer's receipt of notice of loss as required by statute, insurer is liable for claim despite exhaustion of policy limits -- Fact that provider filed claim with incorrect claim number is not defense to payment of claim -- PIP insurer's liability for claim is not affected by fact that claim was submitted to and paid by secondary insurer after rejection by PIP insurer
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, LLP, as assignee of Barbara Maughan, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. County Court, 9th Judicial Circuit in and for Osceola County. Case No. 2011 SC 000140 SP. March 20, 2012. Carol Engel Draper, Judge. Counsel: Rutledge M. Bradford, Bradford Cederberg, P.A., Orlando, for Plaintiff. Wendy Pepper, Andrews & Manno, P.A., Tampa, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER having come before this Honorable Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment and this Honorable Court having heard arguments of counsel and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds and holds as follows:
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff moves for Final Summary Judgment with respect to its claim for breach of contract against USAA for failing to observe the mandatory $5000.00 set aside for Emergency Service Providers for a billing submission sent within 30 days of the carrier's notice of the loss. USAA's insured was involved in a motor vehicle collision on 7/5/2010 and on that same day sought treatment with the Plaintiff in the St. Cloud Hospital Emergency Department. Plaintiff is a physicians group that provided "emergency services and care" as defined in Fla. Stat. Section 395.002(9), within the meaning of Fla. Stat. Section 627.736(4)(c) UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION received notice of the subject accident from it's named insured on July 6, 2010 and assigned a claim number to her claim on July 6, 2010.
On July 16, 2010, the Plaintiff's billing company mailed the CMS 1500 form to USAA PIP, Medical Claims Dept, PO Box 5000, Daphne Alabama. On July 19, 2010, the CMS 1500 and envelope were received and date stamped at the address in Daphne, Alabama. However, the Plaintiff's CMS 1500 form and the envelope were returned to the Plaintiffs billing company, along with an undated, unaddressed form letter from Auto Injury Solutions (USAA's vendor for processing mail) indicating they were unable to find a claim to match in their system, and therefore were unable to process the bill and [are] returning it to you. The CMS 1500 had an incorrect claim number on it, although it possessed the name insureds name, address, phone number and date of birth.
On August 25, 2010, the Plaintiff's CMS 1500 form was resubmitted to USAA's address in Daphne Alabama with identical information as has been provided on the initial submission. In response to that submission, AIS located the claim and prepared an Explanation of Review indicating the benefits were exhausted and no payments would be made.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RULING
A. Carrier's Obligation to Honor Statutory
Set Aside Is Mandatory
Relative to a provider of emergency medical services and care for injuries that result from the use or operation of a motor vehicle, Fla. Stat. §627.736 requires reservation of benefits for payment of the provider's claim. Specifically, Fla. Stat. §627.736(4)(c) provides in relevant part:
(c) Upon receiving notice of an accident that is potentially covered by personal injury protection benefits, the insurer must reserve $5,000 of personal injury protection benefits for payment to physicians licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 or dentists licensed under chapter 466 who provide emergency services and care, as defined in s. 395.002(9), or who provide hospital inpatient care. The amount required to be held in reserve may be used only to pay claims from such physicians or dentists until 30 days after the date the insurer receives notice of the accident. After the 30-day period, any amount of the reserve for which the insurer has not received notice of a claim from a physician or dentist who provided emergency services and care or who provided hospital inpatient care may then be used by the insurer to pay other claims.
Id., (2008). Fla. Stat. §627.736(4)(c) (2008) represents a departure from, and an exception to, the common law of the State governing exhaustion of benefits. That common law is outlined in cases such as Progressive American Ins. Co, v. Stand-Up MRI of Orlando, 990 So.2d 3 (Fla. 5th DCA, 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D1746a] and the case on which it is at least partially based, Simon v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 904 So.2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA, 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D1156b]. Implicit is the acknowledgment that the "new," 2008 version of Fla. Stat. §627.736 applies to the instant matter and the question presented is how to apply subsection (4)(c) of the PIP Statute. Applying both rules governing statutory interpretation and existing cases that give insight on applying the new rule requiring reservation of benefits, Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment is granted.
When interpreting a Statute, Courts are required to apply the plain meaning of the language used and apply that language to the circumstances presented by a dispute under that language. Saleeby v. Rock Elson Const., Inc., 3 So.3rd 1078, 1082 (Fla. 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly S106a]. Where the language used is plain, unequivocal and not subject to reasonable differences as to its meaning, there is no occasion to employ other rules of statutory construction and again, the plain meaning of the language used in the statute controls its application to the facts presented. Vreuls v. Progressive Employer Services, 881 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D1990b]. Here, the language of Fla. Stat. §627.736(4)(c) is plain unequivocal and not subject to reasonable difference as to its meaning. As such, the law, as it is written, should be applied to the facts without further resort to alternative maxims of statutory construction.
Subsection (4)(c) requires an automobile insurer providing PIP benefits, such as USAA to reserve benefits for the payment of certain providers under certain circumstances. Up until the effective date of this subsection, insurers had no prior obligation to reserve benefits for any class of medical provider under the PIP statute. Simon, supra. Now, the subsection requires reservations of $5,000 of PIP benefits for the payment of a class of providers into which Plaintiff indisputably fits. Id. Indeed, the phrase used in the law to describe the insurer's obligation is "must reserve," which is mandatory in nature. Given the foregoing, Defendant here was required to reserve benefits for the payment of Plaintiff's claim by virtue of Plaintiff's status as a provider for whom the Subsection requires reservation of benefits.
B. An Improper Claim Number is Not
a Defense to Non-Payment
As Plaintiff points out, USAA plead only exhaustion of benefits as an affirmative defense in this matter. Despite not pleading the affirmative defense of failure to provide written notice of a covered loss, even if such a defense had been plead, the Plaintiff would be entitled to Summary Judgment. Fla. Statute 627.736(4)(b) provides:
(b) Personal injury protection insurance benefits paid pursuant to this section shall be overdue if not paid within 30 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and of the amount of same.
Arguments have been presented that defects in CMS 1500 forms fail to provide the carrier with written notice of the fact of a covered loss, thereby failing to trigger the 30 day window for the insurer to pay a submitted claim. The Fifth District Court of Appeals has weighed in on this issue decisively, both regarding with whom the burden rests to validate a claim and the time frame for doing so. In Superior Insurance Company vs. Libert 776 So2d 360 (Fla 5th DCA 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly D381a], the 5th DCA held, "The statutory language is clean and unambiguous. The insurance company has thirty days in which to verify the claim after receipt of any application for benefits. There is no provision in the statute to toll this time limitation. The burden is clearly upon the insurer to authenticate the claim within the statutory time period. To rule otherwise would render the recently enacted "no fault" insurance statute a "no-pay" plan -- a result we are sure was not intended by the legislature."
Similarly in Palmer vs. Fortune 776 So.2d 1019 (Fla 5th DCA 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly D278a] the 5th District stated, "the legislature placed the burden on the insurer to verify a claim within the 30 day period because the no-fault statute was designed to provide a speedy recovery of PIP benefits. . . . There is no tolling provision of the 30 day period for payment of PIP claims. . . . Although incomplete and erroneous information makes verification of a claim more difficult, the statutory burden remains with the insurer to make a decision on coverage within 30 days."
C. Exhaustion of Benefits is Not a Defense
The court is aware of and has taken into consideration both the Simon decision and the 5th Districts ruling in Progressive American Insurance vs. Stand Up MRI as it relates to exhaustion. Notably, these decisions neither addressed the 2008 statute, nor involved a statutorily protected class of provider. There are no known cases of controlling precedent on this issue. The sole reported decisions in this matter come from the county court in Volusia county, in which two separate county court judges have ruled on this identical issue. In Orthopaedic Clinic of Daytona Beach, P.A. a/a/o Charles Murray vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1145(a), the court noted, "Exhaustion of benefits is not an Defense to Plaintiff's cause of action. Whether USAA acted in good faith or not is not the issue. The issues boil down to whether the Plaintiff timely filed its claim; whether the claim was for services meeting the definition of emergency services and care: whether the need for those services was related to the accident; and whether the charges were reasonable." The court finds this reasoning sound and persuasive and finds exhaustion of benefits not to be a defense in this matter.
D. Submission to A Secondary Payor is Immaterial
It is not contested that the claim at issue was submitted to a secondary insurance source after USAA failed to pay the bill on two submissions, nor that payment was made by the health insurer. Taken in the light most favorable to USAA, these facts do not change the analysis or outcome of this case. The responsibility of USAA in this matter is not altered by the subsequent payment by a secondary carrier. Because PIP is primary, and secondary carriers are required to be reimbursed if they pay out on an accident related bill, USAA's liability here is not affected by any payment by a health insurer.
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed this issue in Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. vs. Matthews 498 So2d 421 (Fla 1987). The Court held that the statute (627.7372(2)(b)) did not bar the subrogation rights of a health care insurer. In addressing the argument proffered by the Respondent, (that in enacting a no-fault concept of motor vehicle insurance, the legislature intended to limit in-fighting within the industry by limiting suits between insurers, . . . thus Blue Cross as an insurer who suffers no competitive disadvantage against other health insurer should not be permitted to sue to recover collateral source benefits paid to its insured) the court stated, "Respondents arguments is fallacious." The court went on,
The statute in question is contained in the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, section 627,730 which establishes the no-fault concept between motor vehicle insurers. This is equitable and beneficial to such insurers because each insurer receives both benefits and detriments; . . . This equitable arrangement breaks down, however, if the other insurer is a health insurer. The arrangement becomes a one-way transaction with the health insurers always transferring money to the vehicle insurers. The motor vehicle insurance industry would benefit from transferring part of its claims cost to the health insurance industry which might, conceivably, result in lower vehicle insurance rates. However concerned it was with high motor vehicle insurance rates, we do not believe the legislature intended to disguise the costs of such insurance by transferring part of the burden to the health insurance industry and its customers.
See also American Risk Assurance Company vs. Benrube, 407 So2d993 (Fla 3d DCA 1981) "a private insurer may not refuse to pay benefits for which it is primarily liable for the reason that those expenses has been paid by Medicare."
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
* * *
19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 487b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1906CAMB
Insurance -- Personal injury protection -- Coverage -- Medical expenses -- Reasonable, related and necessary expenses -- Summary judgment -- Medical provider's motion for final summary judgment is granted where affidavit of treating physician is sufficient to demonstrate absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to reasonableness, relatedness and medical necessity of treatment and reasonableness of charges, and opposing affidavit of peer review physician does not render opinion as to reasonableness, relatedness or necessity of treatment or reasonableness of charges for dates of service at issue -- Peer review affidavit is technically deficient where affidavit is not made on personal knowledge, affiant would not be able to set forth information in manner admissible in evidence, and affiant cannot show that he would be competent to testify on issue of reasonableness, relatedness and necessity of treatment
DR. KIM REDDICK, DC PA D/B/A COMPLETE WELLNESS CENTER OF ORANGE CITY, as assignee of Patricia Camblin, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 7th Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County. Case No. 2009 11928 CODL. February 20, 2012. Honorable Bryan A. Feigenbaum, Judge. Counsel: Wendelyn L. Gowen, Bradford Cederberg, P.A., Orlando, for Plaintiff. Matthew Corker, Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, et al, Orlando, for Defendant.
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER having come before this Honorable Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment, and this Honorable Court having heard arguments of counsel and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds and holds as follows:
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff moves for Final Summary Judgment with respect to its claim for breach of contract against STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter "STATE FARM") as the treatment provided by Plaintiff was reasonable, related and medically necessary and the charges were reasonable. STATE FARM' s insured was involved in a motor vehicle accident on April 13, 2006 and thereafter sought treatment from the Plaintiff STATE FARM paid for treatment rendered by the Plaintiff from May 9, 2006 through July 17, 2008. Then, while Ms. Camblin was treating with the Plaintiff, STATE FARM requested Ms. Camblin to be seen by Dr. Gary Weiss, D.C. for an Independent Medical Evaluation (hereinafter "IME"). At the conclusion of the IME Dr. Weiss opined that Ms. Camblin had reached an end point as to any further future expected positive benefits from continued care within his specialty. Dr. Weiss advised that in his opinion, any further diagnostic testing, massage therapy, or chiropractic care would not be reasonable, related or necessary from the accident at issue. Thus, on July 22, 2008, STATE FARM mailed a letter to Ms. Camblin advising that her chiropractic benefits, physical therapy and lost wages would be terminated after July 27, 2008. Ms. Camblin continued to treat with the Plaintiff and when her bills for dates of service July 31, 2008 through July 1, 2009 were not paid, the Plaintiff mailed STATE FARM a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation. In response to the Notice, STATE FARM advised that Ms. Camblin's chiropractic benefits were terminated as of July 27, 2008 and therefore no payment would be made towards the dates of service at issue.
On October 7, 2009, the Plaintiff served the Complaint in this matter, wherein the Plaintiff is seeking payment of $1,036.48 plus the applicable interest for dates of service July 31, 2008 through July 1, 2009. During the litigation of this matter, on August 22, 2011, Plaintiff's counsel advised Defense counsel that Dr. Weiss had passed. Thus in October of 2011, the Defendant properly obtained a Peer Review from Dr. Gene Jenkins. However, the Defendant failed to provide or file the Peer Review until it was hand-delivered to Plaintiff's counsel on January 17, 2012, which was only three days before the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment. The Court notes that Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment was filed with the Court on December 1, 2011, along with Plaintiff's Notice of Filing Affidavit of Kim Reddick, D.C. in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment with the Affidavit of Kim Reddick, D.C. attached. Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment was scheduled to be heard by the Court on January 20, 2012.
The Affidavit [of] Gene Jenkins, Jr., D.C. was an 11-page, single-spaced document that attached 392 pages. The Peer Review was performed in October 2011, but again not provided until days before the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment. The Peer Review consisted of 11-pages, wherein the 1st page discussed the documents reviewed, pages 2, 3, 4, and 5 did not discuss dates of service at issue, pages 6, 7, 8 and 9 had only short statements as to the dates of service at issue, wherein the remainder of those pages concerned dates of service that are not at issue, the 10th page set forth Dr. Jenkins conclusion that being that the records fell below the minimal record keeping requirements and the 11th page was Dr. Jenkins sign off. The Peer Review also discussed services provided by medical providers other than the Plaintiff. Then, the Affidavit [of] Gene Jenkins, Jr., D.C. stated "[a]fter an in depth review of the medical records and attached documents, and for the reasons set forth in my report dated October 25, 2011 it is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the treatment provided by Kim Reddick, D.C. to Ms. Patricia Camblin on dates of service 7/31/08, 8/5/08, 8/28/08, 9/10/08, 10/1/08, 10/24/08, 11/19/08, 12/18/08, 1/4/09, 2/16/09, 3/5/09, 3/31/09, 4/17/09, 5/18/09, 6/23/09, and 7/1/09 is not reasonable, related, and/or necessary to the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident which is the subject of this litigation." However, the Peer Review at no time stated that the treatment provided was not reasonable, related or necessary or that the amount charged was unreasonable.
At the time of the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment, the Defendant had two (2) affirmative defenses raised, which stated as follows:
18. Defendant obtained a report from a physician licensed under the same Chapter of Florida Statutes as Plaintiff's treating physician who determined that further chiropractic treatment and/or testing would not be reasonable, related or necessary as a result of the automobile accident. As such, Defendant has a reasonable basis to deny payment of the subject benefits. Dr. Gary Weiss performed examined Patricia Camblin on or about July 9, 2008. Dr. Weiss opined that Ms. Camblin had reached an end point with regard to any further chiropractic care, testing or treatment. She was noted to have preexisting degenerative disc disease. Therefore any chiropractic care, treatment or testing following July 27, 2008 was not paid by STATE FARM as being not reasonable, related or necessary as a result of the automobile accident which is the subject of the Complaint. Further, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance, the Medical Payments Coverage until the policy expired on 4/13/2008
19. Plaintiff failed to meet a statutory and/or contractual condition precedent to the filing of this lawsuit by failure to serve a compliant pre-suit demand letter as required under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the terms and conditions or the applicable contract of insurance. As such, Plaintiff's lawsuit is premature and subject to dismissal by this Court or in the alternative the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of right and law.
The Defendant at no time sought leave of court to amend its affirmative defenses to include an affirmative defense asserting the treatment provided was not reasonable, related or necessary and the amount charged was unreasonable based upon Dr. Jenkins Peer Review.
However, on January 20, 2012, the Parties appeared in the courtroom at the scheduled hearing time to argue Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment, wherein Defense counsel handed Plaintiff's counsel its Notice of Withdrawal of Defendant's Second Affirmative Defenses dated 1/20/12 with the original signature, thus same had not yet been filed with the Clerk of Courts at that time. Defense counsel also handed Plaintiff's counsel Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment. The Court heard argument as to Defendant's Notice of Withdrawal of Defendant's Second Affirmative Defense and ruled that since the actual argument on the Final Summary Judgment had not begun that the withdrawal was timely. The Court, however, recognized that this affirmative defense was one of the matters argued in Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment and thus Plaintiff's counsel would have time expended in preparing to argue same.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RULING
1. Plaintiff has met its prima facie duty to put forth evidence that the treatment provided was reasonable, related and medically necessary and that the charges are reasonable.
2. The Defendant asserts that the Affidavit of Kim Reddick, D.C. is conclusory and self-serving. The Court rejects the Defendant's assertions and finds that the Affidavit of Kim Reddick, D.C. sets forth a factual basis for the opinions rendered as required in Progressive Express Insurance Company v. Francisco M. Gomez, M.D., P.A., 2006 WL 2616376 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006).
3. The Court finds that the Affidavit of Kim Reddick, D.C., the treating physician, is not conclusory and is sufficient to meet the Plaintiff's burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness, relatedness and medical necessity of the treatment provided, as well as the reasonable amounts charged. Progressive Express Insurance Company v. Quality Diagnostic Inc. as assignee of Elda Aviles, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 433a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. (App.) 2006).
4. The Court finds that the Affidavit of Kim Reddick, D.C. is made on personal knowledge, sets forth facts as would be admissible in evidence and shows affirmatively that Dr. Reddick is competent to testify to the matters stated therein, in compliance with Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e).
5. The Court finds that the filings made by the Defendant (i.e. the Notice of Filing the Original Affidavit of Dr. Gene Jenkins, Jr. in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for [Final] Summary Judgment with the Peer Review, as well as Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment) did not create a genuine issue of material fact.
6. The Affidavit [of] Gene Jenkins, Jr., D.C. addresses two conclusions regarding 1) minimal record keeping standards and 2) administrative violations. The Court finds that the Plaintiff correctly argued that neither of the conclusions are relevant to the issue of whether the treatment provided is reasonable, related or medically necessary or that the amount charged is reasonable. South Florida Pain & Rehabilitation, Inc. as assignee of Kirt Godfrey v. United Automobile Insurance Company, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 981b (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. 2009).
7. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff correctly argued that Gene Jenkins, Jr., D.C. did not offer any opinions in his Peer Review or Affidavit on the cost of the services provided and therefore Defendant failed to rebut the Plaintiff's Affidavit in that regard.
8. The Court finds that Dr. Jenkins, as to the dates of service at issue, did not render an opinion in his Peer Review that the treatment provided was not reasonable, related and/or necessary or that the charges were not reasonable in amount.
9. The Court finds that the Defendant did not present countervailing expert testimony, severely impeach the Plaintiff's expert or present other evidence which created a direct conflict with the Plaintiff's evidence. South Florida Pain & Rehabilitation, Inc. as assignee of Kirt Godfrey v. United Automobile Insurance Company, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 981b (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. 2009).
10. The Court does not find persuasive the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff did not meet its burden of proof in this matter.
11. The Court finds that there are technical concerns with the Affidavit [of] Gene Jenkins, Jr., D.C. First, the Affidavit is not made on personal knowledge when Dr. Jenkins states "[a]fter an in depth review of the medical records and attached documents, and for the reasons set forth in my report dated October 25, 2011 it is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the treatment provided by Kim Reddick, D.C. to Ms. Patricia Camblin on dates of service 7/31/08, 8/5/08, 8/28/08, 9/10/08, 10/1/08, 10/24/08, 11/19/08, 12/18/08, 1/4/09, 2/16/09, 3/5/09, 3/31/09, 4/17/09, 5/18/09, 6/23/09, and 7/1/09 is not reasonable, related, and/or necessary to the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident which is the subject of this litigation" since the Peer Review, as to the dates of service at issue, does not opine that the treatment was not reasonable, related and/or necessary. Second, Dr. Jenkins then would not be able to set forth this information in a manner that would be admissible in evidence. Third, Dr. Jenkins can not show affirmatively that he would be competent to testify as to whether the treatment was reasonable, related and/or necessary.
12. The Court finds that the Defendant failed to rebut the treatment being reasonable, related and/or medically necessary and that the amount charged was reasonable for date of service 1/14/09 in its entirety, and as to CPT Code 97010 on dates of service July 31, 2008 and August 5, 2008, as well as CPT Code 99070 on date of service May 18, 2009 and finally CPT Code 98940 on date of service July 1, 2009.
13. For all of the reasons set forth above, the arguments presented and filings made by the Parties, Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
14. Final Judgment is hereby granted in favor of the Plaintiff, DR. KIM REDDICK, DC PA D/B/A COMPLETE WELLNESS CENTER OF ORANGE CITY, as assignee of Patricia Camblin, wherein Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, the sum of $1,036.48 plus 11% interest in the amount of $396.70 for the total sum of $1,433.18 for which sum let execution issue forthwith.*
15. The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The Court reserves jurisdiction to determine the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to Plaintiff pursuant to Fla. Stat. §§627.736, 627.428 and 57.041.
__________________
*Post judgment interest of 4.75% per annum shall be due on this judgment pursuant to Fla. Stat. §55.03.
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